Policy Register

Security testing and penetration testing policy

How and how often systems are tested by attack, by whom, under what rules of engagement, and how findings are tracked to closure.

How the register reads it

Also calledpen test policy, VAPT, resilience testing
FamilyOperations and technology
Document typePolicy. The regimes ask for the content, not the label; a line pasted as a standard, procedure, plan or schedule is placed here with the label noted.
Expected ownerThe information security lead (CISO or ISMS manager).
Review cadenceAnnual (the register's default: the clauses say planned intervals and on significant change, and do not fix a period).
On the gap list whenDORA is ticked and no line resolves to it (ISO 27001, NIS2 require it too, inside a parent document, so they do not list it separately).
TemplatePenetration testing policy.

Which standards require it, and what each expects it to contain

4 requiring clauses, 3 regimes

Shown on a register for the regimes you tick; with none ticked, ISO 27001 is applied. Requirement text is our own statement of each clause, read from the published text and cited so you can check it against the official text; it is not the instrument verbatim.

ISO/IEC 27001:2022

ISO 27001 8.29 Security testing in development and acceptance

Define and run security testing across the development life cycle.

What the ISO 27002 guidance expects the document to say: Requires security testing processes to be defined and implemented within the development life cycle.

Evidence an auditor accepts: The security testing process defining what testing is performed at which stage, and the acceptance criteria; test results for the period, covering the techniques used such as static analysis, dynamic testing, dependency scanning and penetration testing; evidence testing occurs in the development lifecycle and again at acceptance, rather than only before a major release
Common gap: testing only after release
Source: ISO/IEC 27001:2022; guidance ISO/IEC 27002:2022

DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)

DORA Art. 24 General requirements for the performance of digital operational resilience testing

Financial entities other than microenterprises set up, keep and periodically review a robust, comprehensive programme of digital operational resilience testing within the ICT risk management framework, applied proportionately under Article 4(2), to assess incident preparedness, find weaknesses and fix them promptly. For those entities the programme follows a risk-based approach reflecting the evolving ICT risk landscape, specific risks and the criticality of assets and services; tests are run by independent internal or external parties (internal testers need sufficient resources and no conflicts of interest); issues found are prioritised, classified and remedied with internal validation that they are closed; and appropriate tests are run at least yearly on every ICT system and application that supports a critical or important function (Art. 24(3) to (6)). Microenterprises are outside these paragraphs and test under Article 25(3), balancing testing resources and time against urgency, risk type and criticality. Entities identified by their competent authority must add TLPT under Article 26.

Evidence an auditor accepts: Approved digital operational resilience testing programme with its risk-based rationale (entities other than microenterprises); tester independence records, including conflict-of-interest checks for internal testers; issue log from tests with priority, classification, remediation owner and validation of closure
Common gap: Testing done by the team that built or runs the system
Source: DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)
DORA Art. 25 Testing of ICT tools and systems

The testing programme provides, proportionately under Article 4(2), for appropriate tests such as penetration and end-to-end tests, performance and compatibility testing, scenario-based tests, review of source code where feasible, scans and vulnerability assessments, analysis of open-source components, gap analyses, assessments of network security, reviews of physical security, and questionnaires with scanning software. Central securities depositories and central counterparties also run vulnerability assessments before deploying or redeploying applications or infrastructure components, and ICT services behind critical or important functions (Art. 25(2)). Microenterprises plan their tests by pairing a risk-based approach with strategic planning, weighing the resources and time spent against urgency, risk type, criticality and their capacity to take calculated risks (Art. 25(3)). The at least yearly testing of systems supporting critical or important functions is an Article 24(6) duty on entities other than microenterprises.

Evidence an auditor accepts: Test catalogue showing which Article 25(1) test types are used for which systems and why; vulnerability scan and penetration test reports with dates and scope; pre-deployment vulnerability assessment records (central securities depositories and central counterparties only)
Common gap: Only one test type used for every system
Source: DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)

The NIS2 Directive

NIS2 Art. 21(2)(f) Policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of the cybersecurity risk-management measures

The entity has to be able to say whether its measures work, not merely that they exist. That calls for a defined assessment approach with a schedule, someone sufficiently independent of the people who operate the control doing the assessing, criteria for what effective means, and a route by which findings become tracked remediation. Testing, measurement and independent review all count; a maturity self-score does not, because it measures opinion. This point is the one that closes the loop back to Article 21(4), since the corrective-action duty is triggered by the entity finding it does not comply, and effectiveness assessment is how it finds out.

Evidence an auditor accepts: The documented effectiveness assessment approach, its criteria and its schedule; assessment and test results for the current period, covering the Article 21(2) categories; evidence of independence between the assessor and the control operator
Common gap: Effectiveness inferred from a maturity self-assessment rather than tested
Source: NIS2 Directive

Customizable template

10 sections, 4 cited to requiring clauses

With every regime ticked. Each clause section carries our statement of the clause, guidance beside it and starter wording to adapt; enter your organisation once, edit any section, export to Word, print or text. Every template is a draft to adapt and approve.

  1. Purpose
  2. Scope
  3. Roles and responsibilities
  4. Security testing in development and acceptance ISO 27001 A.8.29
  5. General requirements for the performance of digital operational resilience testing DORA Art. 24
  6. Testing of ICT tools and systems DORA Art. 25
  7. Policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of the cybersecurity risk-management measures NIS2 Art. 21(2)(f)
  8. Exceptions
  9. Related documents
  10. Review and approval

Customise this template The template document on the compliance platform

Do this for every document on your list

Paste the list and get this reading for every document at once, with the owner and cadence against each, the clauses quoted, and the documents the regimes expect that the list does not carry. Eight documents free, no account.

Build a register

Secure development policy · Threat intelligence procedure