Security testing and penetration testing policy
How and how often systems are tested by attack, by whom, under what rules of engagement, and how findings are tracked to closure.
How the register reads it
| Also called | pen test policy, VAPT, resilience testing |
|---|---|
| Family | Operations and technology |
| Document type | Policy. The regimes ask for the content, not the label; a line pasted as a standard, procedure, plan or schedule is placed here with the label noted. |
| Expected owner | The information security lead (CISO or ISMS manager). |
| Review cadence | Annual (the register's default: the clauses say planned intervals and on significant change, and do not fix a period). |
| On the gap list when | DORA is ticked and no line resolves to it (ISO 27001, NIS2 require it too, inside a parent document, so they do not list it separately). |
| Template | Penetration testing policy. |
Which standards require it, and what each expects it to contain
4 requiring clauses, 3 regimesShown on a register for the regimes you tick; with none ticked, ISO 27001 is applied. Requirement text drawn from a human-verified compliance corpus under licence: the corpus statement of each clause, not the instrument verbatim.
ISO/IEC 27001:2022
ISO 27001 8.29 Security testing in development and acceptanceDefine and run security testing across the development life cycle.
What the ISO 27002 guidance expects the document to say: Requires security testing processes to be defined and implemented within the development life cycle.
Common gap: testing only after release
Source: ISO/IEC 27001:2022; guidance ISO/IEC 27002:2022
DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)
DORA Art. 24 General requirements for the performance of digital operational resilience testingFinancial entities shall establish, maintain and review a sound and comprehensive digital operational resilience testing programme as an integral part of the ICT risk management framework, following a risk-based approach.
Common gap: No resilience testing programme
Source: DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)
DORA Art. 25 Testing of ICT tools and systemsThe testing programme shall include a range of assessments and tests (e.g. vulnerability assessments and scans, open-source analyses, network security assessments, gap analyses, physical security reviews, questionnaires, source-code reviews, scenario-based tests, compatibility/performance tests, end-to-end and penetration testing), with critical ICT systems tested at least yearly.
Common gap: Critical systems not tested annually
Source: DORA (Regulation (EU) 2022/2554)
The NIS2 Directive
NIS2 Art. 21(2)(f) Policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of the cybersecurity risk-management measuresThe entity has to be able to say whether its measures work, not merely that they exist. That calls for a defined assessment approach with a schedule, someone sufficiently independent of the people who operate the control doing the assessing, criteria for what effective means, and a route by which findings become tracked remediation. Testing, measurement and independent review all count; a maturity self-score does not, because it measures opinion. This point is the one that closes the loop back to Article 21(4), since the corrective-action duty is triggered by the entity finding it does not comply, and effectiveness assessment is how it finds out.
Common gap: Effectiveness inferred from a maturity self-assessment rather than tested
Source: NIS2 Directive
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